[Al-Firdaus]

Chalabi, the latest American Patsy to Fall (They Never Learn, Do They?)!

The Greeks and Romans enlisted traitors among their subject peoples all in the name of Democracy and where these miscreants wavered, they were unceremoniously ditched and punished for their disloyalty to the elite of their imperial patrons.

The British did the same as did all other imperialists and America is following in their political ancestral imperialist traditions. It therefore comes as no surprise that Chalabi has been kicked off the pedestal he was elevated to by the US. The Next patsy we forsee as the rising star to sink into oblivion is Suu Kii of Burma.

We have seen the eclipsing of another meteor of Jean Bertrand Aristide that fizzled out in the firmaments of has been's, already forgotten in the global and Haitian consciousness.

There will be more. Rest assured.

[slickoe]

That is true. In Nam former VC who "turned" and worked with US GI's were actually held in greater contempt than the VC themselves.

[flyeater]

I've said in the past that there are some involved in this administration who's motives almost appear translucent. Richard Pearle and Achmed Chalabi are two grievous examples. Scary thing is as much power that these two wield in foreign policy no one ever nominated them or voted for them.

[plschwartz]

http://www.nypost.com/news/worldnews/21412.htm via Josh Marshall

JORDAN TIP EXPOSED CHALABI AS IRAN 'SPY'

By NILES LATHEM
Ahmed Chalabi


May 22, 2004 -- WASHINGTON - Jordan's King Abdullah fueled the U.S. move against Iraqi leader Ahmed Chalabi by providing bombshell intelligence that his group was spying for Iran, The Post has learned.

An explosive dossier that the Jordanian monarch recently brought with him to White House sessions with President Bush detailed Mafia-style extortion rackets and secret information on U.S. military operations being passed to Iran, diplomats said.

That new information led to the Bush administration's decision to stop its $340,000-a-month payments to Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress and back an aggressive Iraqi criminal probe into his activities.

The file was compiled by Jordan's intelligence service, which has had an interest in Chalabi since the 1990s, when the Iraqi exile leader was convicted in absentia for embezzling millions of dollars.

The scandal stemmed from the collapse of the Bank of Petra, which Chalabi controlled, the diplomatic officials said.

Just months ago, Chalabi had been favored by Bush administration hard-liners as the next leader of Iraq and sat behind First Lady Laura Bush at the State of the Union Address in January.

The Pentagon airlifted Chalabi and members of the INC into Iraq the day after Saddam Hussein fell and gave them prominent roles in the new governing council, in charge of the Finance Ministry and ridding Iraqi government agencies of Saddam's Ba'ath Party.

But the U.S. already felt burned by the INC's involvement in passing on questionable pre-war intelligence on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.

On Thursday, the relationship came to a bitter end as Iraqi police, backed by U.S. troops and FBI agents, raided Chalabi's palatial Baghdad home and issued arrest warrants for 15 members of the INC.

Officially, the raid was described as part of an Iraqi probe, launched by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.

Among the charges being pursued is that INC members on the government's "de-Ba'athification committee" instead ran a scheme in which they demanded payoffs from ex-Ba'ath Party members. In return, those Ba'athists were allowed to avoid arrest or to stay off lists the INC was preparing of people banned from jobs in the new Iraqi government, sources said.

Chalabi aides running the new government's Finance Ministry are also accused of ripping off $22 million from the Iraqi Treasury when Iraq issued new currency late last year, U.S. officials said.

King Abdullah's dossier provided critical confirmation of U.S intelligence gathered elsewhere that the INC was playing a double game with Ba'athists and that Chalabi and his security chief were passing sensitive information to Iran.

That was when the Bush administration decided to break all ties with Chalabi, sources said.

Chalabi accused the United States of trying to intimidate him at a time when he is speaking out against the U.S. occupation and threatening to go public with bombshell files on the U.N. oil-for-food scandal.

Yesterday, he called an emergency meeting of the Governing Council seeking to get official condemnation of the raid.

[plschwartz]

from the May 24, 2004 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0524/p09s02-coop.html

Pentagon's postwar fiasco coming full-circle?
By David L. Phillips

NEW YORK - Pentagon mismanagement, which takes the form of abuses in Abu Ghraib and confusion in dealing with Ahmed Chalabi's aspiration to political power in Iraq, is part of a disturbing pattern.

Pentagon officials shelved existing postwar plans for the reconstruction of Iraq - yet had no plan of their own. They ignored the advice of Iraqis, except Mr. Chalabi. Critical information was obscured or withheld from Congress. As a result, national interests have been ill-served, and the promise of democracy in Iraq has been betrayed.

The Future of Iraq project was set up more than a year before the war and was led by the State Department. The project also involved 16 other federal agencies and hundreds of Iraqis,and cost $5 million. I was the architect and facilitator of the project's democratic principles working group, which Iraqis called "the mother of all working groups." It was charged with developing a strategy for the political transition after Saddam Hussein was removed from power.

I know that the Future of Iraq project was no silver bullet for all of Iraq's problems. Yet the Pentagon's outright dismissal - and even undermining - of the project was one of its critical mistakes.

Pentagon officials thought the endeavor was too academic and ignored its recommendations simply because it was an initiative of the State Department. As part of a bureaucratic turf battle, Pentagon civilians treated State Department colleagues with disdain and disrespect. Civilians in the Office of Secretary of Defense were scornful of diplomacy itself, which is inherently about dialogue and compromise.

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his inner circle thought they could liberate a nation without even talking with those they were liberating. The Pentagon never had a policy or a program. All it had was a person - Ahmed Chalabi, who agreed with the Pentagon vision of making Iraq a laboratory for democratic development and using it as a launch point for reshaping the broader Middle East.

The State Department had a fundamentally different approach. It engaged Iraqis representing the country's different ethnic and religious groups. It was clear from the beginning of our work, however, that empowering other Iraqis was antithetical to the Pentagon's goal of pushing Chalabi into power.

At a meeting I attended with European diplomats to discuss reconstruction, a Rumsfeld protégé asserted that "Ahmed Chalabi is like the prophet Muhammad. At first, people doubted him but they came to realize the wisdom of his ways."

When a proxy of Chalabi's was wavering on whether to join our working group, he told me that officials in the Office of the Vice President had persuaded him to participate, with assurances that his views would prevail if he participated.

For sure, the Bush administration's decision to purge the Baath party and disband the Army was ideologically driven. In practical terms, the administration also wanted to eliminate centers of political gravity that might impede Chalabi's rise to power.

From the beginning, Pentagon officials and staff from the Office of the Vice President kept close watch on the democratic principles working group. As observers present at every meeting, they were all over the process. But independent-minded Iraqis had their own views about the transition. When representatives of Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress tried to persuade the group to endorse creation of a government in exile, presumably to be led by Chalabi, other Iraqis would have none of it.

Though the working group was ultimately unable to reach consensus on a transition a few months prior to the start of military action, US plans went ahead for a large conference of free Iraqis in December 2002. When Chalabi was pushed to the sidelines of the meeting, Pentagon officials lost confidence in the ability of Iraqis to manage their own affairs and discouraged an Iraqi-led process that would culminate in a basic law and an elected Iraqi assembly.

The irony is not lost on anyone that the Bush administration's current approach mirrors previous plans developed by the Future of Iraq project. Denied self-rule, Iraqis became disaffected with the presence of US occupation. The failure to hand over power to Iraqis is at the root of resentment and rebellion.

Many of today's tensions surfaced in the Future of Iraq project during the run-up to war. However, the administration did not want difficulties to come to light lest they discourage support for the war on Capitol Hill. The Pentagon established the secretive Office of Special Plans. The project's director, a State Department official, was excluded from attending meetings of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.

Dissembling and obfuscation defined the Pentagon's approach all along. Gen. Eric Shinseki was rebuked for suggesting that 200,000 troops would be needed to stabilize Iraq. Pentagon officials refused to provide an estimate of the costs of the Iraq war until September 2003, when congressional hearings were held to consider the administration's $87 billion request. Revelation of abuses at Abu Ghraib were suppressed. In addition, the Pentagon demonstrated an alarming unwillingness to admit mistakes and make course corrections.

One senior career military officer tells me that in the halls of the Pentagon his colleagues are grumbling that one of Rummy's new rules is "Never let the facts interfere with reality."

As a result of the Pentagon's mismanagement, hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqis have died needlessly. In Iraq, the well has been poisoned and a hard job made even harder. The fight against terrorism and the cause of global democracy are also casualties of war.

The administration plan has come full circle - after a year of failed occupation, the administration is finally focused on giving power to Iraqis and establishing self-rule. It's a year behind schedule, but not too late to salvage democracy in Iraq.

• David Phillips is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. He resigned as senior adviser from the US Department of State last September.

[DNeurococo]

From Plschwartz's post:

"Attempts to reach Karim ... in Iraq yesterday were unavailing."

Well, here's why:

"Aras Karim is the fugitive ex-intelligence chief for Ahmed Chalabi. He's the one accused of being an Iranian agent.

According to Time, he has now relocated to Tehran."

(From Josh Marshall's blog).

All I can say is, "wow!". I wonder if the press will hold to account Wolfowitz and other neo-cons who championed Chalabi and gave him tons of U.S. tax dollars?

I wonder if the press will question them about information given to Chalabi that may have led to the deaths of U.S. servicemen?

[LANMaster]

Originally Posted by DNeurococo

From Plschwartz's post:

"Attempts to reach Karim ... in Iraq yesterday were unavailing."

Well, here's why:

"Aras Karim is the fugitive ex-intelligence chief for Ahmed Chalabi. He's the one accused of being an Iranian agent.

According to Time, he has now relocated to Tehran."

(From Josh Marshall's blog).

All I can say is, "wow!". I wonder if the press will hold to account Wolfowitz and other neo-cons who championed Chalabi and gave him tons of U.S. tax dollars?

I wonder if the press will question them about information given to Chalabi that may have led to the deaths of U.S. servicemen?

Sheeeezzz,
Anything the current Administration does, is being twisted for political mud.
Damned if he does, damned if he doesn't.
Josh marshall now has even less respect from me. (not that he has had much, ever)

Hey Jack, where's the blogger condemnation here?
How about some consitency from you, eh?

[Stoner]

Bloggs

Mostly I don't read'em unless your posting them
I don't read eggys either

[plschwartz]

LAN
Chali yesterday was spitting venom at the CIA so there is probably some history there maybe on use of certain info?
But they do seem to have him by the short hairs.
Also saw the ambassador from Iraq and she was more then a little concerned that we had such distain for a member of the Iraqi Council.
She was dismissive of the Iraqi court that ordered the search
Is this the same court that indited Satr for murder

But this would be high level espionage and I am suprized that you are so dismissive of a charge that well might have caused US lives.
If the murder chage agin Satr was trumped up then what about all the US and Iraqi lives in Karbala ?

To Iraqis these guys are not extremists but Patriots

[LANMaster]

Same court? I don't know. But Sadr was seen killing the other Clerec on the steps of a shrine. Not ordering someone to kill, but actually killing the other Clerec himself.

I'm not at all saying the murder charge against Sadr is trumped up. I think that is pretty clear.

I disagree. To the majority of Iraqis, these guys ARE extremists, terrorists, and mostly from outside of Iraq. My opinion.

[LANMaster]

One more thing.

Chalabi could have really used this to his benefit if he was innocent, by stating that he could understand the confusion and that he would be proven not guilty. Instead, he sure is acting like he's afraid of something. My opinion.

[plschwartz]

LAN
I had not heard that Sadr actually did the killing any references?

While I have sort of an admiration of his gall I loath the man. However that does not belie the fact that the way his home was invaded was an affront to the Iraqi council. Image if we did that the Rumsfelds home?

BTW considering how long he was able to get the neocons to lie down with him I suggest a proper nickname would be M. butterfly
(Jeremy Irons plays Rene Gallimard: An American diplomat, stationed in China, who falls head-over-heels in love with a local opera singer. Rene lacks self-confidence-both at his job, and in his marriage to Jeanne; a push-over, if you will. All this changes after a night at the opera and a brief exchange with the headlining star, Song Liling.

John Lone plays Song Liling: An opera singer who seduces Gallimard, and later, manipulates him into disclosing secret diplomatic information. Song also harbors a dark secret, which directly coincides with harboring an Adam's apple.)

( The main problem with M. Butterfly is one of credibility. All other issues momentarily aside, there is a huge question that needs to be answered: How can Gallimard have lived with, and made love to, this person for eighteen years, yet not recognized that Liling is actually a man? )

[LANMaster]

Here's some more on the actual events of that killing.
I may have been mistaken that Sadr actually performed the deed.

From The Autralian

Exerpt;

On April 10, Khoei and several associates visited the holy shrine to meet the present ayatollah, Ali al-Sistani.

According to the brief, Juhy has found an eyewitness who is willing to testify that Sadr, who saw Khoei as a threat to his ambitions, became aware of Khoei's visit and planned with his associates to kill him.

A second eyewitness says that when Sadr and a group of followers entered the mosque and saw Khoei's group, Sadr's followers said; "Just say the word, master, and we will attack."

The brief says: "Sadr replied, 'Just wait, just wait'."

A funeral procession then came into the mosque, and using this distraction, Sadr called to his followers to attack.

"(The) witness reported that Sadr said, 'By the will of God, attack'."

Sadr then left the mosque and returned to his office, whereupon his followers drew AK-47s from their robes and started firing in the direction of Khoei and his group in the Khaladaria, an area in which the offices of the mosque clerics are located.

Khoei's bodyguard was armed with a pistol and returned fire.

"During the course of the firefight Khoei suffered an injury to his hand, losing a couple of fingers. When the Khoei group ran out of ammunition, Riyadh Nouri, a key Sadr lieutenant, called out on a megaphone for a ceasefire," the brief says.

"He offered Khoei a hearing to defend himself in Sadr's nearby office. Khoei agreed, but as they emerged from the Khaladaria in the mosque, the Sadr mob descended upon them and began beating and stabbing them.

"At the entrance (of the mosque), Haider al-Kaliedar (Khoei's bodyguard) died from the knife attacks. At this point, Khoei and two of his group broke free and ran to the office of Sadr, suffering from many stab wounds and the beatings. Sadr refused to open the door to the office.

"At this point, a merchant from across the street came and collected the three persons, helping them into his shop. There Khoei passed out from his stabbing and gunshot wounds. Two clerics from the Sadr office came into the shop and tested Khoei's pulse.

"They then left and reported to Sadr. The mob gathered outside the shop and Sadr left his office.

"There is a (third) eyewitness who can testify that Sadr gave the direction to take him (Khoei) away and 'Kill him in your own special way'.

"Khoei was dragged from the shop and down the street by his feet, with his head banging on each of the stone steps down to the next street level. He was dragged up that street to about 50 metres from the entrance to the Imam Ali mosque, and there a Sadr follower produced an AK-47 and shot Khoei in the head.

"The other two persons who were left in the shop when Khoei was dragged out escaped to the coalition forces compound in Najaf and subsequently left the country."

It is those two survivors of the fight that the judge has flown to London to interview.

According to Kelly, 12 of Sadr's followers -- the stabbers and shooters -- were arrested soon after the killings, and warrants were issued in August for Sadr and several of his more senior followers.

Attempts to arrest those followers, and the closure of Sadr's newspaper for inciting violence, were met by his call for all Shi'ites to rise against the coalition forces.

[LANMaster]

How can Gallimard have lived with, and made love to, this person for eighteen years, yet not recognized that Liling is actually a man?

He must have been pretty stingy in the sack.

[plschwartz]

LAN thanks for the Sadr Post I agree that there is a real judge and hard evidence and reason for his arrest. Had this been made more public perhaps and handled in a more culturally appropriate way things might have been different in Kabala. But any experts we may have in cultural matters in Iraq would be on State and not DoD. No matter what bombing a mosque is not good news. Even the Israelis in Bethlehem didn't attack killers in a church - they knew better.